WEED v. DAYTON.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
WEED v.DAYTON.
A widow who supported herself and daughter by keeping a boarding-house at
G. in this state, owning a quantity of furniture suitable for a boarding-house, took
a furnished house for a year in the city of New York, and went there to keep
boarders, intending to return to G. at the end of the year and resume her business
there. Her furniture was stored in the meantime in G. and while so stored was
attached by a creditor. Held1. That the furniture, if otherwise exempt, did not become open to attachment
by reason of its being stored and not in actual use.
2. That the furniture was not exempt as being necessary for the use of her
boarders, nor on the ground that the boarders were a part of her family.
3. That the inquiry is, what was necessary for the personal comfort of the
family, as such ; but that the term "family" in this case was not limited to the
mother and daughter alone, but, as she was keeping hoarders, might properly include a servant, and in any case would include a visitor, or a dependent relative
who was living in the family.
4. That in determining what was necessary household furniture, her occupation
might properly be considered, and if her keeping boarders made it necessary for
her to have more furniture for her personal use, as an additional bureau, or other
like convenience, such additional furniture would bd exempt.
TRESPASS on the case, against the defendant as a constable, for
not having kept and produced certain household furniture attached
by him in a suit of the plaintiff against one Fanny Ensworth, the
plaintiff having recovered judgment in the suit and demand having
been made on the defendant for the goods attached. The court
found the following facts:
On the trial it was conceded that the only question in dispute
was whether the property attached was, or was not, at the time,
exempt from attachment and execution. If not exempt, the liability of the defendant was admitted. If exempt it was not claimed.
The property was attached February 15th 1868.
Of the property so attached Mrs. Ensworth owned four mattresses,
one mahogany bedstead, one three-quarter mahogany bedstead,
one marble-t6p bureau, and one extension table, in all of the value
of one hundred and fifty dollars. She also owned, at the time of
the attachment, in addition to the foregoing articles, ten mattresses,
and two bedroom suits of furniture, together with carpets, washstands, tables, chairs, and other ordinary household furniture, in
all of the value of four hundred and fifty dollars, the whole value
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of the houschol.1 furniture then owned by her being six hundred
dollars.
Mrs. Enswe',h was for more than a Year previous to the 15th
of February 1868, a widow, her family consisting of herself and
daughter. She kept boarders at Greenwich, in this state, as her
only means of support, during the summer of 1867, during which
time all of the property attached had been in use. She left Greenwith in October 1867, and, before February 15th 1868, had taken
a furnished house in the city of New York for a year, in which
she kept boarders.
It was Mrs. Ensworth's intention from the time she left Greenwich, up to and after the time of the attachment in question, to
go to housekeeping again, at the end of the year's lease of the
furnished house, with her own furniture, and to keep boarders as
before for her living, as she had no other meais of support.
At the time of the attachment all of her household furniture was
stored away, m6stly packed, in the house she had occupied at
Greenwich. After the portion attached had been receipted, February 24th 1868, the whole of the furniture was removed to, and
stored in, the town of Portchester, in the state of New York.
None of the household furniture was too expensive or extravagant
for a person in ner condition in life, and was all necessary for her
support in the business of keeping boarders, when not living in a
furnished house. But except for the purpose of keeping boarders,
none of the furniture so attached wasj (in addition to hel" other
furniture) necessary for her support, or that of her family, or to
enable her and her daughter to live in a comfortable and convenient
manner in ordinary housekeeping.
Upon these facts the case was reserved for the advice of this
court.
Hoyt and Fessenden, for the plaintiff.
Uurtis, for the defendant.
SEYMOUR, C. J.-The first point made by the plaintiff is, that
the property being in store and not -in actual use at the time of
attachment, it was for that reason not exempt. We think this
point is not well taken. It appears from the finding that the pro-.
perty was in keeping for future use and in disuse only temporarily.
The point is made by the defendant that, inasmuch as Mrs.
Ensworth supported herself by keeping boarders, and intended to
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continue in that business, the household furniture kept for the
boarders and necessary for their use, is exempt fiom attaclment.
An exemption as ample as this might perhaps commend itself to
the legislature, but is not warranted by the statute as it now is.
The statute secures to the debtor and his dependent family the
personal use by him and them of such household furniture ,sis
essential to their personal comfort. We shall consider herearter
who may properly be regarded as included in tb c flmily. Mere
boarders are not such within the meaniig.of the statute. Furniture
used by them for a compensation, and useful to the debtor himself
only as a means of profit, is not protected from attachment.
The remaining question relates to the. extent to which the farniture attached was necessary for Mrs. Ensworth, for supporting
life within the fair intendment of the law. This is a question
rather of fact than of law, and to be decided in view of all the circumstances of each particular case.
In regard to the four mattresses, it would seem quite clear that
they wbre properly attached. She owned fourteen of them, and
only four were taken.
In regard to the two bedsteads the.finding is not sufficiently full
to enable us to decide definitely. If it be true, as the finding
seems to indicate, that Mrs. Ensworth owned but four in all, we
are inclined to think she ought to be permitted to keep all of
them. She is of course entitled to one for herself, and one for her
daughter. A spare bed for visitors is always allowed. Keeping
boarders as she had been doing, and intended to continue to do,
it seems reasonable that a bed should be allowed for a servant, or
in case of sickness for a nurse. The exemption is not necessarily
restricted to such furniture as is in constant use, nor is it, as before suggested, restricted to the use of the debtor himself. Reasonable provision may be made according to circumstances for
wife and children, for domestics, for dependent relatives who nv
be residing with and Constitute a part of the family, and for
visitors.
As to the bureau and extension table, they are conveilient
articles and may be necessary within the meaning of the sIatute.
It is found that Mrs. Ensworth had tables in addition to illc one
attached, and also 'bad other ordinary household furniture sufficient to enable her and her daughter to live in a comfortable a. d
convenient manner "in ordinary housekeeping;" by ihich we
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understand that the bureau and extension table were not regarded
by the judge as necessary, except as they were made so by the
circumstance that she kept boarders. If the bureau was kept for
the mere use of boarders and used solely by them, it would not be
exempt, but Mrs. Ensworth had a right to engage in the business
of keeping boarders, and if, in consequence of being thus engaged,
she needed for her personal use a bureau which "in ordinary
housekeeping" she might have dispensed with, we are inclined to
think the bureau would be exempt. Tile fact that she was keeping boarders would naturally enlarge her personal needs in respect
to many things, as for instance in respect to kitchen utensils and
table furniture, and perhaps apparel, and would by consequence
enlarge her wants as to a place of deposit, like a bureau, for her
own use. In deciding what is necessary household furniture the
avocation of the debtor may properly be taken into consideration. His personal wants and those of his family may depend
largely upon the nature of the business whereby he is seeking a
livelihood.
Our advice to the Court of Common Pleas is therefore1. That the property, if otherwise exempt, did not become
liable to attachment merely because it was in store and not in
actual use.
2. That articles are not exempt merely because necessary for
the use of boarders.
3. That the mattresses attached were not exempt; and as to
the other articles, that further inquiry be made by the court as to
their being necessary household furniture upon the principles
which have been suggested in the foregoing opinion.
The finding of the court below that,
"Cexcept for the purposes of keeping
boarders, none of the furniture so attached was necessary for her support, or
that of her family, or to enable herself
and her daughter (all the regular family)
to live in a comfortable and convenient
manner, in ordinary housekeeping."
would seem to have concluded all question under ordinary general statutes of
exemption, as the Connecticut statute
seems to be. But the court below, having stated the particular grounds of such
finding, enabled the court of errors to

revise the finding ; and the exposition
of the law by the learned Chief Justice
seems eminently just.
Many of the states have reduced the
exemptions from attachment into more
specific form, by enumerating the particular articles, or the value which shall
be exempted under each particular head.
But where this is not done the courts
have commonly adopted a liberal construction, and that view seems very
wisely and discreetly illustrated in the
foregoing opinion. There have been
some severe and insensible refinement-
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upon particular points connected with
these exemptions-as to what constituted
the tools of one's trade, or necessary
household furniture, for upholding life.
Those terms are capable of such refinement as to embrace nothing under the
term "tools" but the few instruments
used in the hand, or theymay be so extended as to embrace extensive and complicated machines, used in the carrying
on of one's trade. The proper medium
will be found where the mechanic is left
sufficient tools and instruments to enable
him to carry forward the business of his
trade without material hindrance.
So too in regard to household furniture, it should be limited to such articles
as the debtor procures for his actual use,
and such as at the time of procuring

tlem he considered needful for his comfort and that of his visitors and servants.
And with this limitation, where the
statutes are general and without specific
limitation, it has not been common for
the courts to allow creditors to invade
the dwelling, with the purpose of raising
the question how much less furniture his
debtor can possibly contrive to live with,
in his reduced circumstances. Furniture, when purchased for bond fide use, is
never regarded as an investment, or as
forming any portion of the corpus of the
estate ; and when not made the instrument of defrauding creditors, or needlessly extravagant, will seldom be regarded by creditors as any just resort
for the collection of debts.
I. F. R.

City Court of Baltimore, Maryland.
STRASBURGER v. BURK.
The principles of public policy which make void all contracts tending to the
corrupting of elections held under authority of law, apply equally to what are
called primary or nominating elections, although these are mere voluntary proccedings of the voters of certain political parties.
A contract to procure a nomination for a public office by providing liquors,
&c., to voters, is void, and the courts will not aid either party in its enforcement.
THE father of the appellant, who is a citizen of Baltimore,
desired to be nominated by the Democratic party at the primary
election held on the 4th of August 1873, as its candidate for member of the first branch of the City Council for the Fifth ward, at
the election which was held ii September of the same year. He
was in Europe at the time, and the management of the canvass
was left entirely to the appellant, who accordingly applied for assistance to the appellee, the keeper of a lager beer saloon, who
professed to have a potential influence with the numerous German
voters of the ward.
The appellee stated that he had already been applied to on the
subject by another person, but was willing to give his aid to the
appellant's father for an adequate consideration. A contract was
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accordingly made between the parties, by which the appellee was
not only to give his political influence in favor of Strasburger, Sr.,
but was also to furnish lager beer and cigars to the voters of the
ward at the saloon of the appellee. And the appellee now
brought this action against the appellant for refreshments fur.nishied, as he alleged in pursuance of the contract, on the day of
the primary election, to the amount of $18, consisting of two kegs
of bee.r, a box of cigars, and also some extra beer supplied after
the kegs were exhausted. It was not denied that some of this
beer was ordered, and an order to the appellee, written by the
appellant and signed Strasburger & Son, a firm of which the appellant was a member, and produced at the trial, was in these
words: " Put the amount of beer up that I told you, and I will
pay." The beer and cigars were consumed early in the day, but
without the anticipated effect, for Strasburger, the elder, failed to
obtain the nomination.
Judgment was given for plaintiff, and defendant then appealed
to this court.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
G. W.

BROWN,

C. J.-It

is admitted that the appellant paid

the appellee $10, but the object of the payment is disputed. The
appellant contends that it was on the account sued on, while the
appellee insists that it was paid in consideration of his services in
securing voters, and that the account for beer and cigars is still
due. It is a matter of no importance on what account the money
was paid, for the entire contract is contrary to public policy, and
is therefore void. The Code, article 30, section 20, provides that
if any candidate at any election, or other person, shall, at or before
the day of election, give, bestow, or promise, any gift or reward to
secure any person's vote, or shall keep or suffer to be kept any
house, tent, booth, or other accommodation, during the day of holding the election, and before the close thereof, at his expense, where
any victuals or intoxicating liquors shall be gratuitously given or
dealt out to voters, he shall be subject to a penalty not exceeding
$500, and suffer such imprisonment as the court may adjudge, not
exceeding six months, and such other penalties as are prescribed
by time Contstitution. This is a penal statute, and the punishment
prescribed can only be inflicted on conviction in a criminal proceeding, but any contract made to violate its provisions is necessarily

STRASBURGER v. BURK.

void. A similar statute was passed in England in the seventh year
of William III., and various cases have there held that any contract made in violation of its provisions could not be enforced in
the courts. There is also a similar statute in North Carolina, and
the Supreme Court of that state, in the case of Duke v. Ashbee,
11 Iredell 112, which was a suit to recover the price of liquor furnisbed previous to an election, says emphatically: "Among the
most corrupting practices of candidates for office is the one wp are
considering in this case; it is bribery of the most vicious and destructive tendency, and deserves to find no favor either in courts
of justice or from the people themselves." It is clear, then, on
authority, and it is equally clear on principle, that the whole contract in this case, if the election had been one appointed by law,
would be illegal and void, because it would be in violation of the
policy of the statute, as well as immoral and injudicious in tendency.
But it is contended that this was a primary election not held under
the authority of law, but merely a voluntary expression of the opinions of the Democratic voters who chose to attend, and therefore
that the considerations of public policy which apply to legal elections have no application to it. These primary elections, however,
although they are not prescribed by law, are recognised and sanctioned by it, for the Act of 1867, chapter 867, makes it the duty
of the Board of Police Commissioners "to preserve order at primary meetings and elections ;"-in fact they have grown to be an
essential part of our political system. Imperfect and unsatisfactory
"and liable to gross abuse as they are, they constitute almost the
universal mode by which candidates everywhere are now brought
before the people for their suffrages. If they are tainted by fraud
or corruption, our political institutions are contaminated at their
source.
The same principles of public policy, therefore, which apply to
elections ordained by law must for the same reasons be applicable
to the primary elections. It is equally injurious to the public
whether a man sells llis influence with the voters at a primary election or at a legal election, and it is equally corrupting to the voters
whether they arc treated to beer and cigars to influence their votes
at a primary election or at a legal election. The judgment below
was for the appellee. I therefore reverse it, but as there is no
merit on either side, and as costs in these cases are left entirely to
VoL. XXII.-40

.
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the discretion of this court, I direct that each party shall pay his
own costs.
The question decided in the foregoing
opinion is one of the highest importance,
not only in its general bearing upon all
contracts, but more especially, in regard to the particular class of contracts
here presented. There can be no question that all contracts, intended to interrnpt or control the freedom of elections,
in any form, or to any extent, must be
regarded as against the policy of the
law, and consequently void. And this,
we think, results most unquestionably
from the general principles of the common law, altogether independent of any
statutory enactments upon the subject.
It requires no argument to prove that
the freedom of elections, in every department of the government, is the indispensable condition of their existence.
It may be true that no such thing exists,
in fact, or even can exist, under the
present state of public opinion. But
they are nevertheless valid laws. And
the same is equally true of all laws,
however high or holy. They cannot be
,enforced against the combined force of
.public sentiment. But they are none
-the less valid laws, and it is the duty of
-courts so to declare and to hold all contracts made in contravention of them
absolutely of no effect and utterly sub-versive of the true policy of the law.
All contracts for the sale of spirits or
wines, all wagers, all games, or sports,
and all other things, however fashion
able, or of common occurrence, among

men or women, of the highest pretence
to culture and fashion, whether in a
common beer saloon, or in the spacious
and gorgeous saloons of Europe or
America, if prohibited by law, or by the
policy of the law, are equally infamous
and discreditable to all parties concerned
in them. And no evasion or circumlocution can renler them respectable or
valid in law, or worthy of the countenance of any court, whatever opinions
we may entertain of the wisdom or justice of such laws. The decisions are
all in one direction upon the general
question of illegal contracts, or those
in contravention of positive law, as well
as the particular form of illegality here
presented. It would be idle to attempt
to exclude this case from the general
rule, because the primary meetings for
nominating candidates are not recognised
by any statutory enactments. They are
intended to have, and do have, the most
controlling effect upon the final elections, and it would be absurd to limit the
freedom of elections to the latter. The
invalidity of all such contracts is discussed in detail by ALDIs, J., in Nichols
v. 3Mudgett, 32 Vermont Reports 546.
And we have said all we desire to say,
upon the general question of the invalidity of contracts i.r property, or rights
of action, held in conflict with the established policy of the law, in Spalding
v. Preston, 21 Vt. Reports 9.
1. F. R.

Supreme Court of Ohio.
TIE UNION MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO. v. SARAH A.
McMILLEN.
A'ife-policy issued by a foreign company, is not rendered void by the neglect
of the company to comply with the provisions of the Act of April 16th 1867, providing for the incorporation and regulation of insurance companies ; nor will such
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neglect, in an action brought against the company on the policy, excuse the
policy-holder from paying premiums according to the terms of the policy.
Where a life-policy is made and accepted, upon the expressed condition that if
the annual premium it not fully paid within the time specified, the policy "shall
be null and void, and wholly forfeited," the failure to pay the premium avoids the
policy. •
Where the policy also provides that no agent of the company, except the president and secretary, can waive such forfeiture, authority conferred upon an agent
before the premiums became due to collect them, does not impliedly invest him
with authority to waive the forfeiture.
Notwithstanding the limitation upon the power of agents, declared in the policy
in respect to waiving the forfeiture, the company is competent to invest such authority in any of its agents. The authority may be express, or it may be implied
from circumstances, but the burden of showing it in either case, is on the party
claiming the benefit of its exercise.
An agent, having no authority to waive the forfeiture, acting in the interest of
the assured, received the unpaid part of a premium on a forfeited policy, after the
life insured had ended, for which he gave a receipt antedated, and forwarded the
money to the company, concealing the facts as to such payment. Held, that the
receiving of the money by the company, in ignorance of such facts, was no ratification of the act of the agent in receiving the money.
The fact that the company, on tendering back the money so received, omitted to
return certain notes given in part payment of premiums, but which the forfeiture
of the policy rendered uncollectable, will not affect the rights of the parties in a
suit on the policy ; nor is the fact that the notes are payable to order material,
where they show on their face the ionsidcration for which they were given.

to the Court of Common Pleas of Logan county. Rethe
District Court.
served in
The action below was on a policy of insurance, issued by
the plaintiff in error, in the name of Daniel K. McMillen, the
husband of the defendant in error, and insuring his life for her
sole and separate use. The annual premium was $33.32, which
was to be paid on or before the first day of December in every
year, during the continuance of the policy. The policy bore date
February 2d 1868, but in the body it purported to operate from
the 1st of December 1867.
The policy contained the following provision
"Provided especially,* and this policy is made, and it is accepted
by the assured and the said Daniel K. McMillen, upon the
express condition that if the amount of any annual premium
herein provided for is not fully paid, with the interest due thereon,
on the day and in the manner so provided for, then this policy
shall be null and void, and wholly forfeited, and also that no agent
of this company, except the president or secretary, can waive such
forfeiture, or alter this or any other condition expressed in this
ERROR
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policy. . . . And it is also a condition of this policy, accepted by
the assured therein, that in case it becomes null and void, for any
of the above causes, or by forfeiture, or otherwise, all payments
of premiums made thereon, and all dividend credits accruing
therefrom and remaining unpaid, and all apportionments of profits
thereto, shall also be null and void, and shall riot constitute any
claim against the company to any party."
Durkee, the agent of the company at Bellefontaine, testified at
the trial that, on the 1st of December 1868, when the premium for
the second year became payable, he was absent. On the llth of the
same month, a few days after his return, McMillen came to him
and executed the premium note for $16, and the cash note for $8,
dating both as of the 1st of December, but no money was paid.
MeMillen requested the agent, when he was about to remit to the
company, to call on him at the post-office and get the money, which
the agent promised to do. When the agent was about to make his
next remittance, he called on McMillen and said to him he would
like to have the cash part of his renewal for 1869-$8.32. MeMillen remarked that he was busy making up the mails, and had
not then time to stop, and asked the agent if he would not be
remitting again in a few days. The agent answered that he would
be, and said that when lie next remitted he would let McMillen know. This was the last conversation between them. The
agent stated that when he made his next remittance he never
thought of McMillen.
McMillen died on the 21 day of March 1869. On the morning
of that day, and while MoMillen was in a dying condition, the
policy in question became the. subject of conversation between
Durkee, the agent, and some others who were friends of McMillen.
Durkee informed them of the facts in regard to the last premium.
On one of them expressing regret that the money had not been
paid, Durkee stated that he did not think it would make any difference whether the money was paid at that time or not; that he
considered it his fault, and not McMillen's. One of them remarked,
that if he had the money, he would pay the amount of the unpaid
premium, and expressed a desire to borrow the money for the purpose. Durkee handed him $10, and gave him directions to deposit
it in bank to Durkee's credit. The $10 was on the same day
so deposited, but before the deposit was made, McMillen died.
On the same day, Lyman Dow paid Durkee $10, for which he
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took a receipt, antedated to February 2d. A copy of the receipt
is as follows: "Received of L. Dow, for D. K. McMillen, to be
credited on life insurance policy, this 2d day of February 1869.
E. Durkee."
On March 4th, Durkee reported the policy to the company a,3
renewed December 11th 1868, and enclosed the two renewal notes
before referred to, and $9.32, the cash part of the premium. The
report of this renewal was made by adding it to his previous
monthly report of February, which had been returned to him by
the company for certain corrections. At the same time, he advised
the company of McMillen's death, and in explanation of the omission to include the renewal in his former reports lie said:
" On the 11th of December he came to my house and executed
the notes I here enclose, and it was my fault their not being put in
a former report, he saying to me, ' When you want the cash, call
at the post-office,' he being chief clerk there. My report, 15th
December 1868, should have included his account, but as I went
to the bank for the draft I called, but did not find him, and did
not send the renewal."
In the letter of the president of the company, acknowledging
the receipt of the letter of Durkee of March 4th, with the enclosures, he stated that it appeared from the report that the renewal
premium on this policy, which was due December 1st, was not
paid until December 11th. He further stated that Durkee was
.not authorized to receive it then; and that the policy was not in
force March 2d, when McMillen was reported to have died.
On the 25th of May 1869, the superintendent of agencies of
the company went to Bellefontaine to investigate the facts in reg;ird to the payment of the premiums on the policy. On ascertaining them to be as before stated, he tendered back the money
paid on the last premium; but the tender was' refused. The two
notes taken by Durkee on December 11th 1868, and forwarded to
the company March 4th 1869, were not tendered back.
On these- facts, the court (trial by jury having been waived)
rendered judgmnent for the plaintiff. The case was taken to the
District Court, where it was reserved for decision by this court.
West, Walker & Kennedy, for plaintiffs in error.
Win. Lawrence and J. H. Lawrence, for defendant in error.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-It is admitted by the pleadings that the plaintiff in
error is a foreign corporation, and that, at the time of the issuing
of the policy, and until after the matters in controversy arose, it
had failed to comply with the requirements of the Act of April
.106th 1867, "for the incorporation and regulation of life insurance
companies." S. & S. 218.
By this statute it is declared, among other things, not to be lawful for any agent to act for such corporation, in taking risks, collecting premiums, or in any manner transacting the business of life
insurance in this state, except upon compliance with the provisions
of the act.
The party violating the act is declared to be subject to a penalty
of five hundred dollars for each violation, which is to be sued for
and recovered in the name of the state.
The company claims that its failure to comply with the statute
renders the policy void, while it is insisted, on the part of the assured, that the effect of the statute is not to invalidate the policy,
but to render a compliance with its terms, by the payment of premiums, unnecessary to the maintenance of her action.
Neither of these positions can be supported. The prohibition in
the statute is against persons acting for companies that have not
complied with the prescribed conditions. Such persons alone are
made subject to the penalty.
Whether the statute was meant to invalidate policies issued by
companies in contravention of its provisions, is to be determined
from a consideration of the statute as a whole.
The object of the act is not to make the business of life insurance unlawful. The statute is designed for the protection of policyholders and others dealing with insurance companies. To this
end, it is made unlawful for persons to act on behalf of such companies until the provisions of the statute have been complied with.
But we do not think it was intended to devolve on persons dealing
with the companies the duty and risk of ascertaining whether they
had complied with the statute. On the contrary, it seems to have
been the intention of the legislature to rely on the penalties imposed as sufficient to insure such compliance.
In regard to the claim that, notwithstanding the company is
bound by the policy, yet the other party is excused from performing its condition, it is only necessary to say that if the policy
WHITE,
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operates at all, it must operate according to its terms. The plaintiff's action is founded on the policy, and was brought to enforce
it against the company. The liability of the company, under the
agreement, cannot be separated from the conditions on which it
was made; and in undertaking to enforce it, the plaintiff is bound
to show that these conditions have been performed.
As the statute does not render the policy void, the main questions
arising in the case are:
1. Was the policy, at the time of the death of McMillen, a valid
and subsisting obligation against the company ?
2. If it was not, did the company by its subsequent conduct
ratify the previously unauthorized acts of the agent in receiving
payment of the premium which became due on the 1st of December,
1868 ?
In considering the first question it is to be observed that the
body of the policy contains a provision which declares that the
policy is made and accepted upon the express condition that if the
amount of any annual premium is notfully paid, on the day provided for, then the policy shall become null and void, and wholly
forfeited; and also that no agent of the company, except the president or secretary, can waive such forfeiture, or alter that or any
other condition of the policy.
The parties were at liberty to contract in their own terms; and
where no rule of law or of public policy is contravened, the terms
thus employed must furnish the standard for determining their
rights under the contract.
By the terms of this policy, full payment of the annual premium
on the day provided for, was necessary to its renewal or c.ontinuance. As a consequence of the failure to make such payment, it
is expressly declared that the policy shall become "null and void,
and wholly forfeited." Hence, if there was no authorized extension of the time of payment, the policy had ceased to be operative
long before the termination of the life insured.
This brings us to the question as to whether Durkee, the agent,
had authority from the company to extend the time for paying the
premium, or to bind the company by receiving it after default.
It is declared in the policy that no agent of the company, except
the president or secretary, can exercise such authority. Nevertheless, it was competent for the company to invest Durkee, or any
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other of its subordinate agents, with like authority, if it saw fit to
do so.
But the authority must exist before effect can be given to the
act of the agent varying an express condition of the policy, after it
has once taken effect.
The authority may be express, or it may be implied from the
previous dealing between the company and its agents, or from other
circumstances. But in whatever form its existence is asserted, the
burden of proving it is on the party claiming the benefit of its
exercise.
The evidence as to the mode of doing business between the
company and the agent, is limited to what appears in the statement. Nor is there any evidence showing the system or method
adopted by the company for conducting its business from which
the authority claimed for the agent can be inferred. And after
careful consideration of all the evidence in the case, we are unable
to discover any sufficient ground to warrant the conclusion that
the agent was authorized to extend the time of payment, or to
bind the company by waiving the default.
We have no hesitation in saying that there is sufficient in the
case to show that it was the duty of the company to afford the
policy-holder the opportunity of paying the premium at Bellefontaine, where the agency was established and the policy taken.
And although the agent was absent at the time the premium became due, it does not appear that McMillen was ready or desirous
to pay it during his absence. On the contrary, on the agent's
return, which occurred within a few days, McMillen had the opportunity to make the payment. He gave his notes for part of
the premium. but neglected then to pay the part that was due in
money, as he also did on one or more subsequent occasions when
called on for it. The consequence was that the policy, at the time
of his death, did not subsist as a valid obligation of the company.
Nor do we think the company, under the circumstances, can be
held to have ratified the act of the agent in receiving payment
after the policy had lapsed, and the life insured had ended.
Ratification by the company implies a knowledge on its part of
the facts, or a case in which it was its duty to know them. Durkee
was evidently acting in the interest of the plaintiff in concealing
the facts from the company. This is apparent from the circumstances connected with the receiving of the money, from the ante-
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dating of the receipt, and from his report to the company. There
was no change of circumstances between the time the money was
received, and the time it was tendered back, that can affect the
rights of the parties.
We think there is nothing, therefore, to estop the company from
showing the facts, and it is apparent that as soon as the truth became known the company tendered back the money.
Neither do we think the retaining of the notes by the company
to the time of trial, can be held to give effect to the policy. The
notes and the policy are to be taken together as parts of the same
transaction. The policy is expressly referred to in the notes. In
the premium notes, it is stipulated that their acceptance is in no way
to affect the condition of the policy respecting the forfeiture thereof.
The other note is stated to be given in part payment of the
annual premium on the policy; while the policy itself provides that
-it is to become void, if the annual premium is not fully paid at
the specified time. On the forfeiture of the policy the consideration of the notes failed, and they ceased to be collectible. The
failure of the company to tender them back was, therefore, a
matter of no materiality to the rights of the parties.
There are cases, no doubt, in which equity would relieve against
the forfeiture of a policy, or the company would be estopped from
insisting upon it. But the evidence does not bring this case within
either class. And while it is true that in life policies, punctuality
in the payment of the premiums is of the substance of the contract, yet it is also true that it is a contract eminently requiring
good faith botl on the part of the company and of the policyholder.
The motion for a new trial ought to have been granted. The
judgment will therefore be reversed, and the cause remanded for
a new trial.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
GR"AVES

XT AL. v.

LEBANON NATIONAL BANK.

A National Bank is not bound to make a formal acceptance of a cashier's bond.
Acceptance will be presumed from the presentation to and retention by the bank,
and the entry of the cashier on his duties.
The sureties of a cashier are liable for default made after the execution of their
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bond, although the bank may have published accounts of its affairs, as required by
law, which were untrue and calculated to mislead.
The directors of a National Bank published a statement of the condition of the
bank, showing apparently a correct and prosperot s administration. In fact the
cashier had at that time made defaults which a slight degree of care would have
discovered. Shortly after the publication of the statement the cashier filed a bond
with sureties. On the subsequent discovery of the default and suit against the sureties it was held, that the bond was void as to them, having been based on misrepresentation,.
Setnble, It will be presumed that a surety under such circumstances, had read
and acted on the published statement.

Tins was an action on a surety's bond.
The Lebanon National Bank organized under the Act of Congress of June 3d 1864, a'nd commenced business about the 3d of
August 1869, when one Mitchell was selected as cashier, and was
immediately inducted into office.
Though required to execute
bond immediately, the bond, for reasons not explained, was not
delivered until about the 1st of November following. In June
1870, Mitchell was discovered to be a defaulter, and this action
was brought to recover the amount from his sureties. The defalcations for which the suieties were sought to be held liable were
alleged to have occurred between the 14th of September 1869 and
June 3d 1870. The court below adjudged that they should account
for such as occurred before the acceptance of the bond, and rendered judgment against them for $8089, whereupon they appealed.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LINDSAY, J.-The technical defences relied on are not noticed further than to say that this court does not regard it as essential that
banking institutions, doing business under the National Currency
Act, shall signify their acceptance of the official bonds of their cashiers by a written memorandum to that effect, entered upon the journal or minute-book kept by their directory. The acceptance of the
bond may be presumed from the fact that after it has been submitted to the directory for approval, it is retained by the bank, and
the cashier permitted to enter upon, or continue in1 the discharge
of his duties; and that it was presented to and approved by the
directory may be established by oral testimony: 12 Wheaton
64 ; 3 Pickering 335 ; 2 Met. (Mass.) 522 ; 1 Har. & G. 324, and
Morse on Banking 223.
The first business transacted by the bank, after its organization,
was the purchase of the assets of the banking firm of Burton, Mitchell
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Mitchell, the defaulting cashier, was a member of that

firm, and had been acting as its cashier. The National Bank accepted from Burton, Mitchell & Co., bills and notes represented to
amount to about $51,000, but which, in point of fact, amounted to
only about $39,000. This discrepancy was the result of embezzlemerit by Mitchell, while cashier for the firm, of which embezzlement
Burton, the senior member of the firm, and afterwards a directorof the National Bank, may be presumed to have been ignorant.
The directory seems to have relied implicitly upon the integrity
of Mitchell, and he was thereby enabled not only to conceal the
frauds practiced on Burton, Mitchell & Co., but by such concealment to commence the discharge of his duties as cashier of the
National Bank by a fraud upon it. In October 1869, the banking
association, pursuant to the provisions of section 34 of the National
Currency Act, and the amendment thereto of March 3d 1869,
made a report to the comptroller of the currency, and on the 23d
of that month caused it to be published in the Lebanon Clarion,
showing in detail and under appropriate beads its resources and
liabilities at the close of business, October 9th 1869. This report
was sworn to by Mitchell and certified to be correct by three
members of the directory. Similar reports were made and published in the same newspaper touching the condition of the association on the 22d of January, 24th May, and 9th June 1870. None
of these reports showed embezzlements by the cashier or any
other officer, or in the least excited suspicion, but on the contrary
tended to inspire the public with confidence in the prosperity of
the association and in the integrity of those to whom its business
affairs were committed.

Appellants plead and rely upon the statements thus officially
promulgated by the officers of the bank, as constituting an estoppel
upon it to assert against them claims that can not be established
without showing that these official reports, made and published in
obedience to law, were 'not true. The court is inclined to the opinion that th~ey can not claim immunity upon accountr of any report
made after tfiey became the sureties of Mitchell. The reports are
sworn to by him, and it may be assumed, that upon his representations, and upon what appeared from the books of the association,
as kept by him, the directors were induced to certify to their accuracy. The directors may have been negligent in the discharge
of their duties, and this negligence may have enabled Mitchell for
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the time to misappropriate the funds of the bank, and to conceal
its true condition by the false reports made to the Comptroller of
the Currency, and by false entries upon the books of the bank ;
but this negligence can not avail the sureties who covenanted that
their principal should "we'l and truly perform the duties" of his
position, and should " well and truly account for all moneys and
other valuables that might pass through his hands." Their coveiiant is unconditional, and no failure of duty on the part of the directors, short of actual fraud or bad faith, can be deemed sufficiei;t
to exonerate them from its performance. The exaction of the bond
implies that the association was not willing to rely alone upon the
watchfulness and care of the directory.
There is a question, however, arising upon the facts stated in
the pleadings, and fully sustained by the proof, the decision of
which it seems must be in favor of the sureties, and this question
being decided in their favor, their exoneration from liability on
account of Mitchell's misconduct while acting as appellee's cashier,
and after the bond was delivered and accepted, follows as a necessary sequence. There is no principle of law better settled than
that persons proposing to become sureties to a corporation for the
good conduct and fidelity of an officer to whose custody its moneys,
notes, bills and other valuables are intrusted, have the right to be
treated with perfect good faith. If the directors are aware of
secret facts materially affecting and increasing the obligation of the
sureties, the latter are entitled to have these facts disclosed to them,
a proper opportunity being presented. Morse on Banking 206.
White & Tudor, in their note to the case of Ree8 v. Barrngton, 2
Leading Cases in Equity 360, state the rule as follows: "Wherever, therefore, there is any misrepresentation or even concealment
from the surety of any material fact which, had he been aware of,
he might not have entered into the contract of suretyship, it will
thereby be rendered invalid, and the surety will be discharged from
his liabilities." The case cited fully sustains the principle as stated.
Mr. Justice STORY takes even broader ground : " Thus if a party
taking a guaranty from a surety, conceals from him facts which go
to increase his risk, and suffers hini to enter into the contract under
false impressions as to the real state of facts, such concealment will
amount to a fraud, because the party isbound to make the disclosure ;
andthe omission to make it under such circumstances is equivalent
to an affirmation that the facts do not exist." 1 Story's Eq. 215.
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It may not be true that the directors of the Lebanon Bank had
actual knowledge of the frauds committed by Mitchell while cashier of Burton, Mitchell & Co., nor of the false entries made by him
on the books of the institution under their control, in order to
conceal those frauds, but it is true that either with or without
examination, they published reports of the affairs of the institutt,..
the nature if not the necessary effect of which was to mislead th,.
public. It can not be doubted that these reports reached the eyes
of appellants, who all resided in or near Lebanon, and read the
local paper in which the publications were made, and as they were
each large stockholders in the bank, it may be assumed that they
read and examined at all events the first official statement made by
the officers of that institution. If it could be shown that the directors were cognisant of the fraud of Mitchell, committed on the
first day of his connection with the bank, and in the performance
of his duty as cashier, and that they concealed the fact from appellants, and published the false statement of October 9th 1869,
there could be no doubt that the concealment and publication
would amount to a fraud upon the sureties.
It is proper, however to consider the legal effect of two circumstances connected with the failure of the directory to apprise the
sureties of the fraud of Mitchell, and of the publication of October
23d in the Lebanon newspapers. The first is that those directors
who were witnesses in this cage, state that they were not apprised
of the perpetration of the fraud, and the second is that the report
of October 9th 1869, published on the 23d of that month, was but
a statement of the condition of the affairs of the bank, as shown by
its books. Upon the fir'st question it is to be observed that several
of the directors, and among them Burton, of the former firm of
Burton, Mitchell Co., were not sworn at all, and that it appears
upon the journal kept by the directory, as of date August 8d 1869,
that "The bills of exchange and accounts of the firm of Burton,
Mitchell & Co., bankers, having been submitted for examination,
and examified, it was resolved by the Board of Directors to receive
the same, with the endorsement of Messrs. Burton, Mitchell &
Co., and the cashier was directed to transfer the same to the books
of the National Bank." From the depositions of the president of
the bank, of Wilson, a director, and of Wilkins, who was first the
clerk, and is now the cashier of the institution, it is manifest that
the most cursory examination of the bills, notes and accounts
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turned over to the bank by Burton, Mitchell & Co., would have
disclosed a deficit of more than $12,000. The proof forces the
conclusion that the directory either was advised of this discrepancy
in Mitchell's account, or that it relied on his representations and
the endorsement of Burton, Mitchell & Co., and made no examination, notwithstanding the notes, bills and accounts purchased
amounted to more than half as much as the capital of the institution
for which they were acting. The directors may not have been
bound to notify the sureties of the manner in which this transaction
was conducted, but certainly the latter had the right, under the
circumstances, to presume that in the first business transaction of
the bank involving so considerable an amount the directory exercised at least slight diligence, and this presumption was greatly
strengthened by the published report appearing on the 23d of
October. A fraud may be perpetrated as well by the assertion of
facts that do not exist, ignorantly made by one whom the person
acting upon the assertion, has the right to suppose has used reasonable diligence to inform himself, as by concealing facts known
to exist, which in equity and good conscience ought to be made
known.
The publication as to the resources and liabilities of the bank on
the 9th of October 1869, does not purport to have been made from its
books. It was styled, "Report of the condition of the National
Bank of Lebanon at the close of business October 9th 1869," and
there is nothing in it to indicate that it was founded upon the books
of the association, but, on the contrary, the clear import of the
language used is that it exhibited the actual condition of the affairs
of the bank. Though the forms furnished by the comptroller of
the currency may have authorized the reports to be made out from
the books, yet it is not shown that the sureties knew anything
about these forms, and looking to the law defining the duties as
well of the comptroller as of the officers of the bank, they would
acquire no such information. The 34th section of the Currency
Act as amended, requires every association organized under its
provisions at stated times to make reports to the comptroller, which
"shall exhibit in detail and under appropriate heads, the resources
and liabilities of the association" on certain five specified days in
each year, and publish these reports in a local newspaper, and
authorizes the comptroller to call for special reports from any
association whenever in his judgment it shall be necessary, " in
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order to a fall and complete knowledge of its condition." It
seems, therefore, that before'the delivery and acceptance of the
cashier's bond, and before appellants had become surety for his
diligence, honesty and fidelity, the association, pursuant to the
provisions of the law to which it owed its existence, published to
them and to the world a statement of its condition, from which it
appeared that its affairs were being prudently and honestly administered, and from which they and the public had the right to
believe that the cashier to whom had been intrusted the money,
notes, and valuables of the bank, had, up to that time, acted as a
trustworthy person. If the sureties acted upon the impression thus
created by the affirmative act of the party now claiming to enforce
the stipulations of their bond, it is plain that they should be discharged from liability.
We have already decided that it should be presumed that the
sureties did read and examine the report published October 23d
1869, and it remains to be determined whether the bond was ac6epted before or after that time. It bears no date except "the 1869." The legal presumption, therefore, is that it did
day of not become binding on the bondsmen until the last day of that
year. The bank fails to show the exact date of this delivery.
One of the directors thinks it was about the 1st of October 1869,
while the president and another director fix it at about the 1st of
November. The directory itself was not willing to fix the date of
the acceptance of the bond, and, in an order entered upon its minute book, purporting to record the action of the board at the time
of its approval, neither the month nor the day is given. Considering the presumption arising from the want of specific date to the
bond, and the preponderance of the testimony offered by the bank
itself, we conclude that it was not accepted earlier than the 1st of
November 1869, about one week after the publication of the report
of October 9th of that year.
We have, therefore,'a case in which the directory of the bank
held out io others as a trustworthy officer a man who had been
guilty of repeated embezzlements and frauds, all of which might
have been discovered by the exercise of slight diligence. However
innocently the publication tending to show that Mitchell wias an
honest and faithful -officer may have been made, the fact remains
that the public had the right to act upon the presumption that the
three directors, attesting the accuracy of the statement contained
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in the publication, had made some investigation, at least, to inform
themselves as to the matters to which it related. The effect of the
published report was to inspire the public with confidence in the
officers of the bank, to disarm suspicion and to prevent inquiry.
The losses occasioned by the defalcation of Mitchell, after the
acceptance of his bond, must fall either on the association or his
sureties. The latter are free from blame, and acted with reasonable prudence and discretion. They relied upon the truth of representations made by those having the right to speak for the bank.
These representations have turned out to be untrue. Had the sureties supposed that they were untrue, it cannot be suspected that
they would have entered into the contract of suretyship. Such
being the case, the contract must be adjudged invalid. The judgment against the sureties is reversed, and the cause remanded, with
instructions to dismiss appellee's cross-petition.

United States Circuit Court, Eastern District of Virginia.
In Bankruptcy.
IN RE DANIEL DECKERT, A BANKRUPT.
The provision of the Bankruptcy Act adopting the exemption laws of the several states has been sustained on the ground that it enacted a uniform rule that such
property should be subject to its operation for the payment of debts, as was liable
to judicial process for the same purpose, in the several states.
The Amendatory Act of larch 3d 1873, so far as it departs from this rule and
attempts to exempt property specified in the state laws, in a different manner or
with different effect from that of the laws themselves, is a violation of the constitutional requirement of uniibrmity and therefore void.
Congress, under the Reconstruction Acts, approved the Constitution of Virginia
on April 10th 1869, and ordered it to be submitted to the people. On July 6th
1869 it was submitted and adopted by a large majority of the people, who on the
same day elected a governor, legislature and other state officers. The governor
was inaugurated in September 1869, and the legislature met in October 1869, and
passed acts ratifying the 14th and 15th Amendments-all of these preliminaries
being required by the Reconstruction Acts before the admission of the state to representation in Congress. Congress, on January 26th 1870, passed an act admitting the state to representation. The constitution contained a provision for homestead exemption, but this was not applicable to debts incurred prior to the time
the constitution went into effect. Held, that as to this clause the constitution went
into effect on the day of its ratification by the people, July 6th 1869.
DECKERT was adjudged a bankrupt upon his own petition on the
81st of March 1873. An assignee was appointed May 16th 1873,
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to whom his real and personal property was assigned in due form.
So much of the personal property as was exempt under the bankrupt law was duly set off by the assignee. Its value was estimated
The bankrupt, however, claimed a homestead exat $337.75.
emption in the real property under the provisions of the constitution and laws of Virginia and the Act of March 3d 1873, amendatory of the Bankrupt Law; and on his petition the District Court
of the Western District of Virginia ordered such homestead to be
set off to him.
Certain judgment and other creditors now filed this petition for
a review of that order.
By Art. 40, of the Constitution of Virginia, adopted in 1869, it
was provided that every householder or head of a family should be
entitled, in addition to the articles then exempt from levy or distress for rent, to hold exempt from levy and sale under execution,
&e., issued on any demand for any debt theretofore or thereafter
contracted, his real and personal property, &c., to the value of
$2000, to be selected by him. An act of the General Assembly
of Virginia, approved June 27th 1870, gave effect to this provision
by prescribing in what manner and upon what conditions such
householder could set apart and hold such exemption.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WAITE, C. J.-[After stating the claims of the petitioning
.creditors.] Under the bankrupt law, as originally enacted, there
was exempted from the assignment of property required to be made
by the bankrupt to his assignee, among other, such property as
was exempt from levy and sale under execution by the laws of the
state in which the bankrupt had his domicil at the time of the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, to an amount not
exceeding that allowed by such state exemption laws in force in the
year 1864.
By an amendatory act, passed on the 8th June 1872, this provision was changed so as to give the bankrupt the benefit of exemptions under laws in force in 1871. In 1872 the Court of
Appeals of Virginia unanimously decided (22 Gratt. 266), that
the provision of the Constitution above referred to, and the statute
giving effect to the same, so far as they applied to contracts entered
into, or debts contracted before their adoption, were in violation
of the Constitution of the United States, and therefore void. After
VOL'. XXI.-41
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this decision, on the 3d March 1873, Congress passed another act
in the following words:
Be it enacted, &c., That it was the true intent and meaning of
an act approved June 8th 1872, entitled, &c., that the exemptions
allowed the bankrupt by the said amendatory act should and it is
hereby enacted that they shall be the amount allowed by the constitution and laws of each state respectively as existing in the yar
1871 ; and that such exemptions be valid against debts contracted
before the adoption and passage of such state constitution and
laws, as well as those contracted after the same, and against liens
by the judgment or decree of any state court, any decision of any
such court rendered since the adoption and passage of such constitution and laws to the contrary notwithstanding."
The first question which presents itself for our consideration is
whether the Act of 1873, in so far as it seeks, in the administration
of the bankrupt law, to give an effect to the exemption laws of a
state different from that which is given by the state itself, is constitutional.
Congress has power to "establish uniform laws on the subject
of bankruptcies throughout the United States." (Constitution,
art. 1, see. 8.) A bankrupt law, therefore, to be constitutional,
must be uniform. Whatever rules it prescribes for one it must for
all. It must be uniform in its operations, not only within a state,
but within and among all the states. If it provides that property
exempt from execution shall be exempt from assignment in one
-state, it must in all. If it specially sets apart for the use of the
bankrupt certain property, or certain amounts of property in one
state, without regard to exemption laws, it must do the same in
all. If it provides that certain kinds of property shall not be assets under the law in one place, it must make the same provision
for every other place within which it is to have effect.
The power to except from the operation of the law property
liable to execution under the exemption laws of the several states,
as they were actually enforced, was at one time questioned, upon
the ground that it was a violation of the constitutional requireinent of uniformity, but it has thus far been sustained, for the reason that it is made a rule of the law, to subject to the payment of
debts under its operation only such property as could by judicial
process be made available for the same purpose. This is not unjust, as every debt is contractel with reference to the rights of the
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parties thereto under existing exemption laws, and no creditor can
reasonably complain if he gets his fall share of all that the law, for
the time being, places at the disposal of creditors. One of the
effects of a bankrupt law is that of a general execution issued in
favor of all the creditors of the bankrupt, reaching all his property
subject to' levy, and applying it to the payment of all his debts
according to their respective priorities. It is quite proper, therefore,
to confine its operation to such property as other legal process
could reach. A rule which operates to this effect throughout the
United States is uniform within the meaning of that term, as used
in the Constitution.
The Act of 1873 goes further, and excepts from the operation
of the assignment not only such property as was actually exempted
by virtue of the exemption laws, but more. It does not provide
that the exemption laws as they exist shall be operative and have
effect under the bankrupt law, but that in each state the property
specified in such laws, whether actually exempted by virtue thereof
or not, shall be excepted. It in effect declares by its own enactment, without regard to the laws of the states, that there shall be
one amount or description of exemption in Virginia and another
in Pennsylvania. In this we think it is unconstitutional, and therefore void. It changes existing rights between the debtor and the
creditor. Such changes, to be warranted by the Constitution,
must be uniform in their operation. This is not. The consequence is that the Act of 1872 remains unchanged, notwithstanding its attempted amendment in 1873.
The Act of 1872 gives effect to the exemption laws of Virginia
as they existed in 1871. The particular law under which the bankrupt in this case claims his exemption was passed in 1870; it does
not apply to contracts made or debts incurred previous to the time
the new Constitution went into effect. That certainly was not
before July 6th 1869, and the debts due to Smith, Wanderlink,
and Schindel were all incurred previous to that date. That of
Smith dates from the time the note was given upon which his judgment was rendered, that of Schindel from the making of the contract out of which the indebtedness arose, and that of Wanderlink
from the time of the execution of the note which he holds. As
against these creditors the bankrupt is not entitled to the benefit
of the exemption.
The claim of Roberts & Co. requires us to determine at what
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time the Constitution, as far as it relates to the provision in question, took effect. It is claimed by the bankrupt that this was on
the 6th July 1869, when the Constitution was ratified by the
people, and by the creditors that it was postponed until the 26th
of January 1870, when the act was approved admitting the state
to representation in Congress. The contract upon which Roberts
& Co. base their claim was made, as has been seen, on the 15th of
November 1869.
This Constitution was adopted in accordance with the provisions
of the reconstruction acts of Congress. These acts provided in
substance that when the people of the rebel states should have
formed a constitution in conformity with the Constitution of the
United States, and should have done certain other things named,
such state should be entitled to representation in Congress. It
was also further provided that until the people of any of such states
should be by law admitted to representation in Congress, any civil
government which might exist therein should be deemed provisional
only, and in all respects subject to the paramount authority of the
United States, at any time to abolish, modify, control, or supersede
the same.
In pursuance of these acts, a convention duly elected assembled
in Richmond on the 3d of December 1867, and proceeded forthwith to frame a constitution, which was certified to Congress as
required by law, and thereupon an act was passed by Congress
and approved on the 10th of April 1869, authorizing its submission to a vote of the people, and an election of the state officers
provided for and of members of Congress. The same act provided
that if the Constitution should be ratified at such election, the legislature of the state then elected should assemble at the capital of the
state on the fourth Tuesday after the promulgation of the ratification, and that before the state should be admitted to representation in Congress, the legislature that might thereafter be lawfully
organized, should ratify the fifteenth amendment proposed by
Congress to the Constitution of the United States, and all the
proceedings under the act should be approved by Congress.
Under the provision of these several acts the President of the
United States issued his proclamation, designating the 6th July
1869, as the time for submitting the Constitution to the vote of
the people. On that day the vote was taken, and resulted in an
almost unanimous ratification. The state officers, members of
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Congress, and members of the General Assembly were elected at
the same time. The governor, thus elected, was inaugurated on
the 21st September 1869. The General Assembly met on the
5th of October, and on the 8th passed acts ratifying the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments. It then adjourned to reassemble after
Congress should approve this action of the people.
On the 26th January N70, Congress passed an act admitting
the state to representation, and reciting that the people of Virginia had framed and adopted a constitution of state government
which was republican.
From this it will appear that the Constitution was adopted and
the government, partially, at least, organized under it previous to
the 15th November 1869. 'It is true that the Constitution was
adopted and the organization made to obtain admission to representation in Congress, but it is equally true that it was framed and
ratified by the people as and for a constitution of state government.
Admission might follow its adoption, but was not necessary to give
it effect. On the contrary, Congress required that it should become operative and have effect before the admission could be
granted.
In the Act of April 10th 1869, it was provided that at the time
the vote upon the ratification was taken there should be an election
by the voters of members of the General Assembly and all the
officers of state provided for by the Constitution; that if the Constitution should be ratified the legislature should assemble at the
capitol on a day named, and that, when lawfully organized, it
should act upon the ratification of the proposed amendments.
There certainly could be no lawful action by a legislature under
the Con*stitution unless the Constitution was in force at the time the
action was had. That Congress understood that the Constitution
was in force and operative at the time of the admission is apparent
from the terms of the act granting such admission. In that it was
recited that the people of Virginia had framed and adopted a constitution of-state government which was republican; that the
legislature elected under the Constitution had ratified the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, the performance of which acts
in good faith was a condition precedent to the representation of
the state in Congress, and because this had been done such representation was permitted.
It is true that the government was not fully organized in all its
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departments under the Constitution, and that the United States
retained its supervisory powers under the reconstruction acts, until
the final action of Congress. Complete organization of the government, however, was not necessary to give effect to the Constitution, and no modification of the particular provision now
under consideration was ever attempted by the United States.
The government established by the people remained as established
until actually changed by the United States in the exercise of its
supervisory powers.
In our opinion the Constitution of Virginia took effect, so far
as it related to the provision for exemptions, on the 6th of July
1869-the day of its ratification by the people. It follows that
the exemption laws passed to give effect to that are to become
operative for the benefit of its citizens from that date. As against
Roberts & Co., therefore, the bankrupt is entitled to his homestead.
The order of the District Court allowing an assignment of the
homestead as against the claims of Smith, Wanderlink and Schindel is reversed, but it is affirmed as against that of Roberts & Co.
IOND, J., concurred.
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Where rights of individual citizens are not derived originally from the Constitution, but are part of the political inheritance from the mother country, the power
of Congress does not extend to the enactment of positive laws for the protection
of such rights, hut only to the prevention of the states from violation of them.
But where a right is derived from the Constitution and affirmative legislation is
necessary to secure it to the citizen, then Congress may pass positive laws for the
enforcement of the right and for the punishment of individuals who interfere
with Ft.
These principles apply to the 14th Amendment equally with the rest of the
Constitution, and there can he no constitutional legislation under that amendment
for directly enforcing the privileges und immunities of citizens of the United
States by original proceedings in the Federal courts, where the only constitutional
guaranty of such privileges is that no state shall pass any law to abridge them,
and where the state has in fact passed no such laws.
The 13th Amendment gave Congress power to pass positive laws for doing away
with slavery, hut it did not give power to pass laws for the punishment of ordinary
crimes against the colored race any more than against any other race. That
power remains to the states.

UNITED STATES v. CRUIKSHANK

-

ET AL.

To constitute an offence of which Congress and the Federal courts can take cognisance under this amendmont, there must be a design to injure a person or deprive
him of his right, by reason of his race, color or previous condition of servitude.
The 15th Amendment confers no right to vote. That is the exclusive prerogative of the states. It does confer a right not to be excluded from voting by reason
of race, color or previous condition of servitude, and this is all the right thaet
Congress can enforce.
Semble, Congress may pass laws to protect this right under the 15th Amendment from individual violation, although the laws of the state are not repugnant
to the amendment.
But offences against the right to vote are not cognisable under the power of
Congress, unless they have as a motive the race, color or'previous condition of
servitude of the party whose right is assailed.
The war of race, 'whether it'assumes the dimensiong of civil strire and domestic
violence, or is limited to private outrage, is subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, but outrage or violence, whether against colored people or white
people, which lacks this motive and springs from the ordinary impulse of crime,
is within the sole jurisdiction of the individual state, unless the latter by its laws
denies to any race the full equality of protection.
An indictment for conspiracy to interfere with the right peaceably to assemble,
&c., or with the right to bear arms, or " to deprive certain citizens of African
descent of their lives and liberiies without due process of law," where the state
has not passed any law interfering with such rights or denying equal protection to
all its citizens, is not sustainable in a United States court under any law that Congress had power to pass.
An indictment for conspiracy to deprive certain citizens of African descent of
the free exercise and enjoyment of the right to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property which is enjoyed by
white citizens, does not in the absence of a specific allegation of adesign to deprive
the injured persons of their rights on account of their race, color or previous condition of servitude, charge any offence cognisable in a United States court.
&mble, such an indictment is also bad for vagueness.
S
The Act of Congress of May 31st 1870, commonly called the Enforcement Act,
so far as it assumes to regulate the right to vote, is beyond the scope of the 15th
Amendment and Void. And an indictment under it for conspiracy to hinder certain citizens of African descent in the exercise of their right to vote, cannot he
sustained in a United States court without an allegation that the conspiracy was to
hinder, &c., by reason of their race, color or previous condition of servitude.
TIs was an indictment founded on the 6th and 7th sections of the
Act of Congress approved Mlay 31st 1870, entitled " An Act to enforce
the right of citizens of the United States to vote in the several states
It contained, two distinct
of this Uni n, and for other purposes."
series of count, in one of which the defendants were charged with having
unlawfully and feloniously banded [or conspired] together to intimidate
certain persons of African degcent (specified by name), and thereby to
hinder and prevent them in, and deprive them of, the free exercise and
enjoyment of certain supposed constitutional rights and privileges, respectively specified in the several counts of the indictment, such ns, in
one count, the right peaceably to assemble themselves together; in
another, the right to keep and bear arms; in a third, the right to be
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protected against deprivation of life, liberty and property without due
process of law; in a fourth, the right to the full and equal benefit of the
laws; in another, the right to vote, &c. The second series of counts
charged murder in addition to, and whilst carrying out, the conspiracies
charged. Three of the defendants, (jruiklshank, ltadnot, and Irwin,
were convicted of conspiracy under the first series of counts., which were
founded oilthe sixth section of the act, and now moved in arrest of
judgment.
BRADLEY, J.-The main ground of objection is that the Act of 1870
is municipal in its character, operating directly on the conduct of individuals, and taking the place of ordinary state legislation ; and that
there is no constitutional authority for such an act, inasmuch as the
state laws furnish adequate remedy for the alleged wrongs committed.
It cannot, of course, be denied that express power is given to Congress
to enforce by appropriate legislation the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments
of the Constitution, but it is insisted that this act does not pursue the
appropriate mode of doing this. A brief examination of its provisions is
necessary more fully to understand the form in which the questions arise.
The first section provides that all citizens of the United States, otherwise qualified, shadl be allowed to vote at all elections in any state,
county, city, township, &c., without distinction of race, color. or previous
condition of servitude, any constitution, law, custom or usage of any
state or territory to the contrary notwithstanding.
This is not quite the converse of the 14th Amendment. That amendment does not establish the right of any citizens to vote : it merely
declares that race, color or previous condition of servitude shall not
exclude them. This is an important distinction, and has a decided bearing on the questions at issue.
The second section requires that equal opportunity shall be given to
all citizens, without distinction of race, color or previous condition of
servitude, to perform any act required as a prerequisite or qualification
for voting, and makes it a penal offence for officers and others to refdse
or omit to give such equal opportunity.
The third section makes the offer to perform such preparatory act, if
not performed by reason of such wrongful act or omission of the officers
or others, equivalent to performance ; and 'makes it the duty of inspectors
or judges of election, on affidavit of such offer being made, to receive the
party's vote; and makes it a penal offence to refuse to do so.
These three sections relate to the right secured by the 15th Amendment.
The fourth section makes it a penal offence for any person, by force,
bribery, threats, &c., to hinder or prevent, or to conspire with others to
hinder or prevent any citizen from performing any preparatory act requisite to qualify him to vote, or from voting at any eleclion.
This section does not seem to be based on the 15th Amendment, nor
to relate to the specific right secured thereby. It extends far beyond
the scope of the amendment, as will more fully appear hereafter.
The fifth section makes it a penal offence for any person to prevent,
or attempt to prevent, hinder, or intimidate any person from exercising
the right of suffrage, to whom it is secured by the 15th Amendment, by
means of bribery, threats, or threats of depriving of occupation, or of
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ejecting from lands or tenements, or of refusing to renew a lease, or of
violence to such person or his family.
The sixth section, under which the first sixteen counts of the indict.
ment are framed, contains two distinct clauses ; the first declares that
" if two or more persons shall band or conspire together, or go in disguise upon the public highway, or upon the premises of another with intent [to violate any provision of this act,] such persons shall be held
guilty of felony." Of course this would include conspiracy to prevent
any person from voting, or fromn performing any preparatory act requisite
thereto. The next clause has a larger scope. Repeating the introductory and concluding words, it is as follows: "If two or more persons
shall band or conspire together, or go in disguise upon the public highway, or upon the premises of another with intent [to injure, oppress.
threaten or intimidate any citizen, with intent to prevent or hinder his
free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured
to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of
his having exercised the same,] such persons shall be held guilty of
felony." Here it is made penal to enter into a conspiracy to injure or
intimidate any citizen, with intent to prevent or hinder his exercise and
enjoymqnt (not merely of the right to vote, but) of any right or privilege
granted or secured to him by the. Constitution or laws of the United
States.
The question is at once suggested, Under what clause of the Constitution does the power to enact such a law arise ?
It is undoubtedly a sound proposition, that whenever a right is guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, Congress has the power
to provide for its enforcement, either by implication arising from the correlative duty of government to protect, wherever a right to the citizen
is conferred, or under the general power (contained in art. 1, sec. 8, par.
18) " to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or any department or officer
thereof."
It was on the principle first stated that the Fugitive Slave Law was sus.
tained by the Supreme Court of the United States. See P~rigv. Penn.
sylvania, 16 Pet. 539. The Constitution guaranteed the rendition of
f'ugiiives held to labor or seriice in any sfate, and it was held that Congress had, by implication, the power to enforce the guaranty by legislation. " They require," says Justice STonY, delivering the opinion of
the majority of the court, "the aid of legislation to protect the right, to
enforce the delivery, and to secure the subsequent possession of the
slave. If, indeed, the Constitution guarantees the right, and if it re.
quires the delivery upon the claim of the owner (as cannot well be
doubted), the natural inference certainly is,that the National Government is clothed with the appropriate authority and functions to enforce
it. The fundamentalprinciple applicable to all cases of this sort, would
seem to be, that where the end is required, the means are given ; and,'
where the duty is enjoined, the ability to perform it is contemplated to
exist on the part of the functionaries to whom it is intrusted. The
clause is found in the National Constitution, and not in that of any state.
It does not point out any state functionaries, or any state action to carry
its provisions into effect. The state, therefore, cannot be compelled to
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enforce them, &c. The natural, if not the necessary conclusion is that
the National Government, in the absence of all positive provisions to the
contrary, is bound, through its own departments, legislative, judicial or
executive, as the case may require, to carry into effect all the rights and
Constitution.'
duties imposed upon it by the
To the objection that the power did not fall within the scope of the
enumerated powers of legislation confided' to Congress, Justice STORY
answers: "Stripped of its artificial and technical structure, the argument comes to this, that, although rights are exclusively secured by, or
duties are exclusively imposed upon the National Government, yet, unless the power to enfbrce these rights or to execute these duties can be
found among the express powers of legislation enumerated in the Constitution, they remain without any means of giving them effect by any
Act of Congress, and they must operate solely propicvigore, however
defective may be their operation; nay, even although, in a practical
sense, they may become a nullity from the want of a proper reniedy to
enforce them, or to provide against their violation. If this be the true
interpretation of the Constitution, it must, in a great measure, fail to
attain many of its avowed and positive objects as a security of rights
and a recognition of duties. Such a limited construction of the Constitution has never yet been adopted as correct, either in theory or practice."
16 Pet. 615, 618.
It seems to be firmly established by the unanimous opinion of the
judges in the above quoted case that Congress has power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, every right and privilege given or guaranteed by
the Constitution. The method of enforcement, or the legislation appropriate to that end, will depend upon the character of the right conferred.
It may be by the establishment of regulations for attaining the object
of the right, the imposition of penalties for its violation, or the institution of judicial procedure for its vindication when assailed, or when
ignored by the state courts: or it may be by all of these together. One
method of enforcement may be applicable to one fundamental right, and
not applicable to another.
With regard to those acknowledged rights and privileges of the citizen,
which form a part of his political inheritance derived from the mother
country, and which were challenged and vindicated by centuries of stubborn resistance to arbitrary power, they belong to him as his birthright,
and it is the duty of the particular state of which he is a citizen to protect and enforce them, and to do nought to deprive him of their full enjoyment.
When any of these rights and privileges are secured in the Constitution of the United States only by a declaraition that the state or the
United States shall not violate or abridge them, it is at once understood
that they are not created or conferred by the Constitution, but that the
Constitution only guarantees that they shall not be impaired by the state,
or the United States, as the case may be. The fulfilment of this guaranty
by the United States is the only duty with which that government is
charged. The affirmative enforcement of the rights and privileges
themselves, unless something more is expressed, does not devolve upon
it, but belongs to the state government as a part of its residuary sovereignty.
For example, when it is declared that no state shall deprive any per-
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son of life, liberty or property without due process of law, this declaration is not intended as guaranty against the commission of murder,
false imprisonment, robbery or any other crime committed by individual
malefactors, so as to give Congress the power to pass laws for the punishment of such crimes in the several states generally. It is a constitutional security against arbitrary and unjust legislation by which a man
may be proceeded against in a summary manner and arbitrarily arrested
and condemned, without the benefit of those time-honored fbrms of proceeding in open court and trial by jury, which is the clear right of every
freeman, both in the parent country, and in this. It is a guaranty of protection against the acts of the state government itself. It is a guaranty
against the exertion of arbitrary and tyrannical power on the part of
the government and legislature of the state, not a guaranty against the
commission of individual offences; and the power of Congress, whether
implied or expressed, to legislate for the enforcement of such a guaranty,
does not extend to the passage of laws for the suppression of ordinary
crime within the states. This would be to clothe Congress with power to
pass laws for the general preservation of social order in every state.
The enforcement of the guaranty does not require or authorize Congress to perform the duty which the guaranty itself supposes it to be the
duty of the state to perform, and which it requires the state to perform.
The duty and power of enforcement take their inception from the
moment that the state fails to comply with the duty enjoined, or
violates the prohibition imposed. No state may pass a law impairing
the obligation of contracts. Does this authorize Congress to pass laws
for the general enforcement of contracts in the states ? Certainly not.
But when the state has passed a law which violates the prohibition,
Congress may provide a remedy. It did so in the 25th section of the
Judiciary Act by authorizing an appeal to the Supreme Court of the
United States in all cases where a constitutional or Federal right should
be denied or overruled in a state-court.
Again, "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privi" leges and immunities of citizens in the several states." But this does
not authorize Congress to pass a general system of municipal law for the
security of person and property, to have effect in the several states for
the protection of citizens of other states to whom the fundamental right
is guaranteed. It only authorizes appropriate and efficient remedies to
be provided in case the guaranty is violated.
Where affirmative legislation is required to give the citizens the right
guaranteed, Congress may undoubtedly adopt it, as was done in the case of
the Fugitive Slave Law, and as has been done in later times, to carry into
full effect the 13th Amendment of the Constitution by the passage, of
the Civil Rights Bill, as will be more fully noted hereafter. But with
regard to mere constitutional prohibition of state interference with es- tablished or acknowledged privileges and immunities, the appropriate
legislation to enforce such prohibitions is that which may be necessary
or proper for furnishing suitable redress when such prohibitions are disregarded or violated. Where no violation is attempted, the interference of Congress would*be officious, unnecessary and inappropriate.
The bearing of these observations on the effect of the several recent
amendments of the Constitution, in conferring legislative power upon
Congress, is next to be noticed.
The 13th Amendment declares that neither slavery nor involuntary
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servitude, except as a punishment for crime, shall exist within the United
States or any place subject to its jurisdiction, and that Congress shall
have power to enfbree this article by appropriate legislation.
This is not merely a prohibition against the passage or enforcement
of any law inflicting or establishing slavery or involuntary servitude;
but it is a positive declaration that slavery ?hall not exist. It prohibits
the thing. In the enforcement of this article, therefore, Congress has
to deal with the subject-matter. If an amendment had been adopted
that polygamy should not exist within the United States, and a similar
power to enforce it had been given as in the case of slavery, Congress
would certainly have had the power to legislate for the suppression and
punishment of polygamy. So undoubtedly, by the 13th Amendment
Congress has power to legislate for the entire eradication of slavery in
the United States. This amendment had ian affirmative operation the
moment it was adopted. It enfranchised four millions of slaves, if, indeed, they had not previously been enfranchised by the operation of the
civil war. Congress, therefore, acquired the power not only to legislate for
the eradication of slavery, but the power to give full effect to this bestowment of liberty on these millions of people. All this it essayed to do
by the Civil Rights Bill, passed April 9th 1866, by which it was declared
that all persons born in the United States, and not subject to a foreign
power (except Indians not taxed), should be citizens of the United
States, and that such citizens, of every race or color, without any regard
to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, should
have the same right in every state and territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property, and to full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings fbr the security of persons and
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and should be subject to like
punishment, pains and penalties, and to none other, any law, &c., to the
contrary notwithstanding.
It was supposed that the eradication of slavery and involuntary servitude of every form and description required that the slave should be
made a citizen and placed on an entire equality before the law with the
white citizen, and therefore, that Congress had the power, under the
amendment, to declare and effectuate these objects. The form of doing
this, by extending the right of citizenship and equality before the law
to persons of every race, and color (except Indians not taxed, and of
course excepting the white race, whose privileges were adopted as the
standard), although it embraced many persons, free colored people and
others, who were already citizens in several of the states, was necessary
for the purpose of settling a point which had been raised by eminent
authority, that none but the white race were entitled to the rights of
citizenship in this country. As disability to be a citizen and enjoy
equal rights was deemed one form or badge of servitude, it was supposed
that Congress had the power, under the amendment, to settle this point
of doubt and place the other races on the same planue of privilege as
that occupied by the white race.
Conceding this to be true (which I think it i'), Congress then had
the right to go further and to enforce its declaration by passing laws for
the prosecution and punishment of those who should deprive, or attempt
to deprive, any person of the rights thus conferred upon them. Without
having this power Congress could not enforce the amendment.
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It cannot be doubted, therefore, that Congress had the power to make
it a penal offence to conspire to deprive a person of', or to binder him in,
the exercise and enjoyment of the rights and privileges conferred by the
13th Amendment and the laws thus passed in pursuance thereof.
But this power does not authorize Congress to pass laws for the punishment of ordinary crimes and offences against persons of the colored
race or any other race. That belongs to the state government alone.
All ordinary murders, robberies, assaults, thefts and offences whatsoever
are cogaisable only in the state courts, unless, indeed, the state should
deny to the class of persons referred to the equal protection of the laws.
Then, of course, Congress could provide remedies for their security and
protection. But in ordinary cases, where the laws of the state are not
obnoxious to the provisions of the amendment., the duty of Congress in
the creation and punishment of offences is limited to those offences
which aim at the deprivation of the colored citizen's enjoyment and
exercise of his rights of citizenship and of equal protection of the laws
because of his race, color or previous condition of servitude.
To illustrate: if in a community or neighborhood composed, principally
of whites, a citizen of African descent, or of the Indian race, not within
the exception of the amendment, should propose to lease and cultivate
a farm, and a combination should be formed to expel him and prevent
him from the accomplishment of his purpose on account of his rave or
color, it cannot be doubted that this would be a case within the power
of Cangress to remedy and redress. It would be a case of interference
with that person's exercise of his equal rights as a citizen because of
his race. But if that same person should be injured in his person or
property by any wrongdoer for the mere felonious or wrongful purpose
of malice, revenge, hatred or gain, without any design to interfere with
his rights of citizenship or equality before the laws, as being a person
of a different race and color from the white race, it would be an ordinary
crime, punishment by the state liws only.
To constitute an offence, therefore, of which Congress and the courts
of the United States have a right to take cognisance under this amendment, there must be a design to injure a*person, or deprive him of his
equal right of enjoying the protection of the laws, by reason of his race,
color or previous condition of servitude. Otherwise it is a case exclusively within the jurisdiction of the state and its courts.
I will next consider the effect of the 15th Amendment, to enforce
which the law under consideration was primarily framed. The amendment declares, that "the right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any state,
on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude," and power
is given to Congress to enforce the amendment by appropriate legislation. Although negative in form, and therefore, at first view, apparently
to be governed, by the rule that Congress had no duty to perform until
the state has violated its provisions, nevertheless in substance, it confers
a positive right which did not exist before. The language is peculiar.
It is composed of two negatives. The right shall not be denied. That
is, the right s7B be enjoyed; the right, namely, to be exempt from the
disability of race, color or previous condition of servitude, as 'respects
the right to vote. In terms it has a general application to all, but the
history of the events out of which the amendment grew, shows that it
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was principally intended to confer upon colored citizens the right of
suffrage. The majority of the court in the recent Slaughter House
cases say : " In the light of the history of these amendments, and the
pervading purposes of them, which we have already discussed, it is not
difficult to give a meaning to this clause." (Speaking of that clause in
the 14th Amendment which prohibits the states from denying to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.) "The
exi-tence of laws in the states where the newly emancipated negroes
exi~ted, which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship again.-t
them ag a class, was the evil to be remedied by this clause, and by it
sueh laws are forbidden." * * * "We doubt very much whether any
action of a state not directed by way of discrimination against the
negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to
come within the purview of this provision :" 16 Wall. 81.
Whether this suggestion of the court, that the recent amendments
were intended for the benefit of the African race alone, be accepted or
not, it is manifest that the 15th Amendment was primarily and principally intended fbr their benefit, and that it does have the affirmative
effect before stated of conferring upon them an equal right to vote with
that enjoyed-by white citizens. It was, in fact, a constitutional extension of the Civil Rights Bill passed in 1866, conferring upon the emancipated slave (as well as all persons of his race) another specific right in
addition to those enumerated in that bill; and it is to be interpreted on
the same general principles.
But whilst the amendment has the effect adverted to, it must be remembered that the right conferred and guaranteed is not an absolute
but a relative one. It does not confer the right to vote. That is the
prerogative of the state laws. It only confers. a right not to be excluded from voting by reason of race, color or previous condition of
servitude, and this is all the rght that Congress can enforce. It confers
upon citizens of the African race the same right to vote as white citizens
possess. It makes them equal. This is the whole scope of the amendment. The powers of Congress, therefore, are confined within this
scope.
The amendment does not confer upon Congress any power to regulate
elections or the right of voting where it did not have that power before,
except in the particular matter specified. It does, however, eonfer upon
Congress the right of enforcing the prohibition imposed against excluding citizens of the United States on account of race, color or.previous condition of servitude. Before the amendment Congress had the
power to regulate elections and the right of voting in the District or,
Columbia and in the territories, and to regulate (by altering any regulations made by the state) the time, place and manner of holding elections
for senators and representatives in the several states. It has that power
still, subject to the prohibition of the amendment. Also, before the
amendment, the states had the power to regulate all state elections and
the right of voting therein. They have that power still, subject to the
prohibition of the amendment and the right of Congress to enforce it.
Congress has not acquired any additional right to regulate the latter
election., or the right of voting therein, which it did not possess before,
except the power to enforce the prohibition imposed on the states, and
the equal right acquired by all races and colors to vote.
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The manner in which the prohibition (or the equal right to vote)
may be enforced, is, of course, the question of principal interest in this
inquiry.
When the right of citizens of the United States to vote is denied or
abridged by a state on account of their race, color or previous condition
of servitude, either by withholding the right itself or the remedies which
are given to other citizens to enforce it, then, undoubtedly, Congress
has the power to pass laws to directly enforce the right and punish individuals for its violation, because that would be the only appropriate
and efficient mode of enforcing the cmendment. Congress cannot with
any propriety, or to any good purpose, pass laws forbidding the state
legislature to deny or abridge the right, nor declaring void any state
legislation adopted for that end. The prohibition is already in the constitutional amendment, and laws in violation of it are absolutely void
by virtue of that prohibition. So far as relates to rendering null and
void the obnoxious law, it is done already; but that does not help the
person entitled to vote. By the supposition the state law gives him no
remedy and no redress. It is clear, therefore, that the only practical
way in which Congress can enforce the amendment is by itself giving a
remedy and giving redress. If the party should be sued in the state
court for attempting to exercise his right, of course the appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States, given by the twenty-fifth section
of the Judiciary Act, would be all the remedy he would need; but it
would be entirely inefficient in securing to him the actual exercise of
his right to vote.
But suppose that the laws of the state are in harmony with the
amendment, at least contain nothing repugnant thereto; has Congress
the power to pass laws concurrently with the state to enforce the right
of every race and color, without regard to previous condition of servitude, to an equality in the right.to vote ?
There is no essential incongruity in the co-existence of concurrent
laws, state and federal, for the punishment of the same unlawful acts
as offences both against the laws of the state and the laws of the United
States Robbery of the mails, counterfeiting the coin, assaults upon a
United States marshal or other officer while in the performance of his
duty, and many other cases of like nature, will readily suggest themselves. See Moore v. llinois, 14 How. 20.
Mr. Justice GRIER, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court
in the case quoted, says: " Every citizen of the United States is also a
citizen of a state or territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two
sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the
laws of either. The same act may be an offence or transaressihn of the
laws of both. Thus, an assault upon the marshal of the United States,
and hindering him in the execution of legal process, is a high offence
against the United States, for which the perpetrator is liable to punishment; and the same act-may be also a grosq breach of the peace of the
state, a riot, assault or a murder, and subject the same person to a punishment, under the state laws, for a misdemea'nor or felony. That either
or both may (if they see fit) punish such an offender cannot be doubted."
The real difficulty in the present ease is to determine whether the
amendment has given to Congress any power to legislate except to furnish redress in cases where the states violate the amendment.
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Considering, as before intimated, that the amendment (notwithstanding
its negative form) substantially guarantees the equal right to vote to
citizens of every race and color, I am inclined to the opinion that Congress has the power to secure that right not only as against the unfriendly
operation of state laws, but against outrage, violence, and combinations
on the part of individuals, irrespective of the state laws. Such was the
opinion of Congress itself in passing the law at a time when many of its
members were the same who had consulted upon the original fortu of
the amendment in proposing it to the states. And as such a construction
of the amendment is admissible, and. the question is one at least of grave
doubt, it would be assuming a great deal for this court to decide the
law, to the extent indicated, unconstitutional.
But the limitations which are prescribed by the amendment must not
be lost sight or. It is not the right to vote which is guaranteed to all
citizens. Congress cannot interfere with the regulation of that right by
the states except to prevent by appropriate legislation any'distinction as
to race, color or previous condition of servitude. The state may establish any other conditions and discriminations it pleases, whether as to
age, sex, property, education or anything else. Congress, so far as the
15th Amendment is concerned, is limited to the one subject of discrimination-on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
It can regulate as to nothing else. No interference with a person's
right to vote, unless made on account of his race, color or previous condition of servitude, is subject to Congressional animadversion. There
may be a conspiracy to prevent persons from voting having no reference
to this discrimination. It may include whites as well as blacks, or may
be confined altogether to the latter. It may have reference to the particular politics of the parties. All such conspiracies are amenable to
the state laws alone. To bring them within the scope of the amendment
and of the powers of Congress they must have for motive the race, color
or previous condition of servitude of the party whose right is assailed.
According to my view the law on the subject may be generalized in
the following proposition
The war of race, whether it assumes the dimensions of civil strife or
domestic violence, whether carried on in a guerilla or predatory form,
or by private combinations, or even by private outrage or intimidation, is
subject to the jurisdiction of the government of the United States; and
when any atrocity is committe,1 which may be assigned to this cause, it
may be punished by the laws and in the courts of the United States;
but any outrages, atrocities or conspiracies, whether against the colored
race or the white race. which do not flow from this cause, but spring
from the ordinary felonies or criminal intent which prompts to such unlawful acts, are not within the jurisdiction of the United States, but
within the sole jurisdiction of the states, unless, indeed, the state, by its
laws, denies to any particular race equality of rights, in which case the
government of the United States may furnish remedy and redress to the
fullest extent and in the most direct manner. Unless this distinction
be made we are driven to one of two extremes-either that Congress van
never interfere where the state laws are unobjectionable, however remiss
the state authorities may be in executing them, and however much a
proscribed race may be oppressed; or that Congress may pass an entire
body of municipal law for the protection of person and property within
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the states, to operate concurrently with the state laws, foi the protection
and benefit of a particular class of the community. This fundamental
principle, I think, applies to both the 13th and 15th Amendments.
After what has been said, a few observations will suffice as to the
effect of the 14th amendment upon the questions under. consideration.
It is claimed that, by this amendment, Congress is empowered to pass
laws for directly enforcing all privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States by original proceedings in the courts of the United States,
because it provides, amongst other things, that no state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, and because it gives Congress power to enforce its provisions by appropriate legislation. If the power to enforce
the amendment were equivalent to the power to legislate generally on
the subject-matter of the privileges and immunities referred to, this would
be a legitimate conclusion. But, as before intimated, that subject-matter may consist of rights and privileges not derived from the grants of
the Constitution, but from those inherited privileges which belong to
every citizen, as his birthright, or from that body of natural rights which
are recognised and regarded as sacred in all-free governments; and the
only manner in which the Constitution rccognises them may be in a
prohibition against the government of the United States, or the state
governments, interfering with them.
It is obvious, therefore, that the manner of enforcing the provisions
of this amendment will depend upon the character of the privilege or
immunity in question. If simply prohibitory of governmental action
there will be nothing to enforce until such action is undertaken. How
can a prohibition, in the nature of things, be enforced until it is violated?
Laws may be passed in advance to meet the contingency of a violation,
but they can have no application until it occurs.
On the other hand, when the provision is violated by the passage of
an obnoxious law, such law is clearly void, and all acts done under it
will be trespasses. The legislation required from Congress, therefore,
is such as will provide a preventive or compensatory remedy or due punishment for such trespasses; and appeals from the state courts to the
United States courts in eases that come up for adjudication.
If these views are correct, there can be no constitutional legislation of
Congress for directly enforcing the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States by original proceedings in the courts of the United
States, where the only constitutional guaranty of such privileges and
immunities is, that no state shall pass any law to abridge them, and
where the state has passed no law adverse to them, but, on the contrary,
his passed laws to sustain and enforce them.
I will now proceed to examine the several counts in the indictment,
and endeavor to test their validity by-the principles which have been
laid down. These have been so fully enunciated and explained, that a
very brief examination of the counts will suffice.
The first count is for a conspiracy to interfere with the right "to
peaceably assemble together with each other, and with other citizens,
for a peaceable and lawful purpose." This right is guaranteed in the
first amendment to the Constitution, which declares that '1Congress shall
make no law abridging the right of the people pea~eably to assemble and
to petition the government for a redress of grievances." Does this disVOL. XXII-42
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affirinance of the power of Congress to prevent the assembling of the
people amount to an affirmative power to punish individuals for disturbThat is the
ing assemblies? This would be a strange inference.
prerogative of the states. It belongs to the preservation of the public
peace and the fundamental rights of the ipeople. The people of the
states do not ask Congress to protect the right, but demand that it shall
not interfere with it.
Has anything since occurred to give Congress legislative power over
the subject-matter? The 14th Amendment declares that no state shall
by law abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States. Grant that'tbis prohibition now prevents the states from inter.
fering with the right to assemble, as being one of such privileges and
immunities, still, does it give Congress power to legislate over the subject?
Power to enforce the amendment is all that is given to Congress. Ifthe
amendment is not violated, it has no power over the subject.
The second count, which is for a conspiracy to interfere with certain
citizens in their right to bear arms, is open to the same criticism as the
first.
The third count charges a conspiracy to deprive certain citizens of African descent of their lives and liberties without due process of law.
Every murderer and robber does this. Congress surely is not vested
with power to legislate for the suppression and punishment of all murders, robberies and assaults committed within the states. In none of
these counts is there any averment that the state had, by its laws, interfered with any of the rights referred to, or that it bad attempted to
deprive the citizens of life, liberty or property without due process of
law, or that it did not afford to all the equal protection of the laws.. The
third count cannot be sustained.
The fourth count charges a conspiracy to deprive certain colored cititens, of African descent, of the free exercise and enjoyment of the right
and privilege to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property which is enjoyed by white citizens.
The right and privilege to interfere with' the exercise of which is here
alleged to have been the object of the conspiracy, is not contained in
the Constitution in express terms. The 14th Amendment, amongst other
things, declares that no state shall deny to any person within its juris.
Aiction the equal protection of the laws. 'But the indictment does not
allege that this has been done. The count manifestly refers to the rights
secured by the Civil Rights Bill of April 9th 1866, which has already
been referred to. That act, as we have seen, expressly declares that all
citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous oondi.
tion of slavery or involuntary servitude, shall have the same right in
every state and territory, to make and enforce contracts, &c., and to full
and equal benefits of all laws and proceedipgs for the security of person
and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.
The conspiracy charged in the fourth count is a conspiracy to interfere with the free exercise and enjoyment of this right.
But the count does not contain any allegation that the defendants
committed the acts complained of with a design to deprive the injured
persons of their rights on account of their race, color or previous condition of servitude. This, as we have seen1 is an essential ingredient in
the crime to bring it within the cognisance of the United States authoritits. Perhaps such a design may be inferred from the allegation that
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the persons injured were of the African race, and that the intent was to
deprive them of the exercise and enjoyment of the rights enjoyed by
white citizens. But it ought not to have been left to inference; it
should have been alleged.
On this ground, therefore, I think this count is defective and cannot
be sustained.
It is also defective on account of the vagueness and generality of the
charge-" to prevent and hinder [them] in the free exercise and enjoyment of their several and respective right and privilege to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings then and there enacted," &c.
It seems to me that such a general and sweeping charge, without any
specification of any laws or proceedings, does not amount to the averment of a criminal act. It is not merely informal, it is insufficient.
The fifth and eighth counts are open to the same objection of vagueness and generality as the fourth, and for that reason neither of them
can, in my judgment, be sustained.
The sixth count charges a conspiracy to prevent and hinder certain
citizens of the United States, who were of African descent and persons
of color, in the exercise and enjoyment of their right to vote at any
election to be thereafter held in the state of Louisiana, or in the parish
of Grant, knowing they bad such right to vote. A conspiracy to hinder
a person from exercising his right to vote at any election is made indictable by the fourth section of the enforcement act; also by the sixth section, read in connection with the first.
Over the general subject of the right to vote in the states, and the
regulation of said right, Congress, as we have seen, has no power to
legislate. The 15th Amendment relates only to discriminations on
account of race, color and previous condition of servitude, and, as we
have before shown, is a prohibition against the making of such
discriminations.
The law on which this count is founded is not confined to cases of discrimination above referred to. It is general and universal in its application. Such a law is not supported by the Constitution. The charge
contained in the count does not describe a criminal offence known to
any valid and constitutional law of .the United States. It should, at
least, have been shown that the conspiracy was entered into to deprive
the injured persons of their right to vote by reason of their race, color,
or previous condition of servitude.
This count I also regard as invalid.
The seventh count charges a conspiracy to injure and oppress certain
colored citizens of African descent, because, being duly qualified to
vote, they had exercised -their right to do so, and had voted, at the
election held in Louisiana in November 1872, and at other times. This
count is subject to the same objection as the last, and is invalid for the
same reason.
The next -eight counts on which the verdict was found are literal
copies, respectively, of the first eight, so far as relates to the language on
which their validity depends. The same observations apply to them
which apply to the first eight.
In my opinion the motion in arrest of judgment must be granted.
The foregoing opinion, although neces- ful reading and attentive consideration.
sarily very long, will well repay a care- It is one characterized, in our opinion,
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by great wisdom and ability, as well as
by the entire freedom from all purpose
of reaching any other but that-result, .
which shall preserve and maintain the
most perfect equipoise between the powers
of the nation and of the states. It may
be thought, bymany, that this latteris no
ground of commendation. But it seems
to us a very eminent quality, even in a
judge of the highest judicial tribunal
in the country, and no one need feel
surprise to find in very unequal degree
among the ablest and best of men and
judges even. This war of state rights
against centralization is one of long
standing and of great animosity, not to
say bitterness, and one where almost all
men have felt compelled to take sides,
more or less. And it always seemed to
us, before the late civil war certainly,
that the demands of the states-rights
party were more extensive and impracticable than any put forth upon the other
side. Even the decisions of the Supreme Court of the nation, in denying
itself all incidental powers or prerogatives, always seemed to us, as we have
before had occasion to say, savoring
largely of extreme caution, and entirely in conflict of the long standing
and much approved maxim : Bonijudicis est ampliarejurisdictionem. Not that
a judge is to usurp authority or power,
or attempt to extend his lawful jurisdLtion beyond its just limits, but that he
should be wise and prompt in devising
lawful means to accomplish all desirable
ends, within the legitimate range of his
proper functions.
But there has been no ground for any
such complaint since the nation acquired
such a sense of its omnipotence during
the civil war. It seems now to be assumed that the nation can do no wrong,
or in other words, that its functions are
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fully adequate to the accomplishment
of all which it deems it desirable to accomplish. And many of the rash experiments at legislation which have been
attempted in Congress, might lead to the
not unnatural expectation, that in the
end Congress would absorb all the important legislation of the country. At such
a time so carefully studied and perspicuously indited an opinion as the
foregoin~g cannot fail to be greatly
assuring to all who may have entertained
doubts, Iwhether, in the end, the assumptions of the legislative department
of the nation would not override and
overwhelm all the other departments of
the government. There can be no question, in the mind of any good lawyer
who has made the limitations between
state and national authority a study, that
the grounds upon which Mr. Justice
BRADLEy holds the provisions of the
law, upon which the indictment rested
in this case, to be unconstitutional and
a usurpation of the field of exclusive
state legislation, are most unquestionable. And although the distinctions
which he makes, iii his opinion, between
the legislative powers of the nation and
the states, as affecting the subject-matter
of the prohibitory provisions of the United
States Constitution, might not readily
have occurred at all, we cannot doubt
they are entirely sound, as far as he
goes, and how much further this limitation may ultimately-be carried, in the
same direction, it is not needful here to
discuss. It is evident the learned judge
entertained some hesitation upon one
point, v~hich, as it was not indispensable
to the decision of the present case, he
left for future consideration. We commend the opinion to the candid and care
ful consideration of all.
I. F. R.

